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I. INTRODUCTION
The freedom of parties to agree to arbitrate their disputes is enshrined by
contract law and federal law.1 By inserting a mandatory arbitration clause in
a contract, both parties agree that, should a dispute arise between them, they

* B.A. Saint Anselm College, 2010; J.D., University of New Hampshire School of Law, 2013. I
would like to take the opportunity to thank Uillame Bell and Carroll Dortch for their insightful comments
and careful editing, which were essential to the writing of this Note.
1. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable . . . .”); see also Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (“In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal
courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements.”).
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will not bring the matter to court.2 Instead, they agree to submit any disputes
to a mutually-agreed-to third party, such as the American Arbitration
Association; this third-party acts like a judge and resolves the dispute.3
Arbitration has many advantages, such as reducing the cost and increasing
the efficiency of dispute resolution.4 Because of these reduced costs and
greater efficiency5, businesses can pass along their savings to consumers by
offering them lower prices and more value.
Notwithstanding all of these advantages, the freedom of parties to insert
enforceable arbitration clauses in their contracts has its fair share of
detractors.6 Big businesses often insert such clauses in take-it-or-leave-it
consumer contracts, such as credit card and cell phone agreements.7
Consumers who want or need the service provided by these businesses are
forced to agree to mandatory arbitration clauses, which grant to both parties
the legal right to insist upon arbitration as the sole dispute resolution
method.8 While almost no one disagrees that arbitration is efficient and less
costly, some argue that it is an unfair process.9 Since the business party
usually appears before the third-party arbitrator repeatedly, whereas the
consumer appears before him only once, the arbitrator may feel inclined to
find in favor of the business party, its repeat customer.10
This debate between efficiency and the unfairness underlies any
discussion about arbitration.11 This note will address this debate by
analyzing merely one facet of arbitration: arbitration waiver.12 All of the
circuits agree that when a party with a contractual right to arbitrate chooses
to litigate a dispute, the party’s election to litigate may waive his ability to
move the case out of court and into arbitration.13 However, they disagree
about what test should be applied to decide whether a particular election to
litigate constitutes arbitration waiver.14 The circuits have formulated

2. Arbitration, U.S. SEC. & EXCH COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/arbproc.htm (last visited
April 1, 2012).
3. Id.; see also About American Arbitration Association, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about (last visited April 1, 2012).
4. Jane Spencer, Signing Away Your Right to Sue, THE WALL ST. J. (Oct. 01, 2003),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB106495674838886400.html.
5. Id.
6. Editorial:
Beware
the
Fine
Print,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
26,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/opinion/27sun2.html.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. Editorial, supra note 6; Spencer, supra note 4.
12. E.g., Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 2011);
Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995); Carcich v. Rederi
A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968).
13. E.g., Erdman, 650 F.3d at 1117; Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390; Carcich, 389 F.2d at 696.
14. See Erdman, 650 F.3d at 1118–19 (“There is a circuit split over whether the party asserting waiver
must show prejudice.”).
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primarily two different tests.15 In the majority of circuits, two elements must
be proven: (1) the party seeking arbitration must have participated in
litigation; and (2) the party resisting arbitration must show that he will suffer
prejudice.16 A minority of circuits keep the first element, but the prejudice
requirement has been eliminated.17
A discussion of this circuit split is timely because the U.S. Supreme
Court, in 2011, expressed its desire to resolve the split by granting
certiorari in an arbitration waiver case.18 Although the case was dismissed
later that same year,19 it appears clear that arbitration waiver is an issue the
Court may seek to take up in the future.
Before we begin an examination of arbitration waiver, notice that there
are two competing policies underlying it. On the one hand, if the courts
make it too easy to waive an arbitration provision, they risk undermining the
bargained-for contractual term, the enforcement of which may lead to greater
efficiency of dispute resolution20 and the resulting benefits to consumers, like
lower prices. On the other hand, if the courts make it too difficult to waive
an arbitration provision, they risk allowing for abuse: litigants will be able to
go to court at first and then assert their contractual right to move the case to
arbitration21 when litigation turns against them.22 The Seventh Circuit has
aptly named this abuse a game of “heads I win, tails you lose.”23
This note seeks to prove that the majority test, which requires prejudice,
should be adopted by all of the circuits.24 In order to prove this, this note will
first discuss the Federal Arbitration Act, a law that requires that arbitration
clauses be placed on the same footing as other contractual terms.25 Second,
this note will examine the majority and minority approaches to arbitration
waiver.26 Finally, this note will show that the majority approach is preferable
because only this approach places arbitration clauses on the same footing as
other contractual terms.27
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1117.
17. E.g., St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prods. Co., 969 F.2d 585, 590
(7th Cir. 1992) (“While none of our cases has stated explicitly that a court may find waiver absent
prejudice, that principle is implicit in our repeated emphasis that waiver depends on all the circumstances
in a particular case rather than on any rigid rules and that prejudice is but one relevant circumstance to
consider in determining whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate.”).
18. Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs., P.A., 387 F. App'x 921 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79
U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2011).
19. Citibank, N.A., 387 F. App'x 921, cert. dismissed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. June 2, 2011).
20. Spencer, supra note 4.
21. Procedurally, a case is moved to arbitration by the filing of a motion to stay the matter, pending
arbitration. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967).
22. Spencer, supra note 4.
23. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995).
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part II.A–B.
26. See infra Part II.C–E; see also infra Part III.
27. See infra Parts IV–V.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Despite the criticism that arbitration receives today, it is nothing like the
hostility that arbitration received in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.28
In the words of Congress, English common law courts were jealous “for their
own jurisdiction . . . . This jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that the
principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was
adopted with it by the American courts. The courts have felt that the
precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative
enactment . . . .”29 This common law precedent meant that, although two
parties may include an arbitration term in their contract, courts were free to,
and often did, ignore such terms to allow a controversy to proceed in court.30
American courts adopted this anti-arbitration bias.31 Thus, for much of
American history, arbitration clauses were not placed on the same footing as
other contract clauses.32
However, this common law precedent began to receive great scrutiny.33
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States rapidly
industrialized.34 This industrialization increased the number of business
disputes, and businesses realized that they needed a way to resolve disputes
out of court that was more efficient.35 Nevertheless, the courts remained
obstinate, maintaining the common law bias of ignoring arbitration
agreements and hearing all disputes.36
Therefore, businesses sought the help of legislatures to force courts to
enforce arbitration agreements.37 First, they lobbied states for laws that

28. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1924)).
29. Id.; see also Preston Douglas Wigner, The United States Supreme Court’s Expansive Approach to
the Federal Arbitration Act: A Look at the Past, Present, and Future of Section 2, 29 U. RICH. L. REV.
1499, 1502 (1995). He observes that the English courts originally adopted this anti-arbitration rule
because of an economic incentive. Id. For each decision rendered, the English courts earned a fee. Id.
To enforce an arbitration agreement would deprive them of this fee. Id. Although this incentive was no
longer driving American courts, they still kept the anti-arbitration rule, with minimal justification for it.
Id.
30. Southland, 465 U.S. at 13 (citing Hearing on S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 6 (1923) (remarks of Sen. Walsh)) (“The Arbitration Act sought to
‘overcome the rule of equity, that equity will not specifically enforce any arbitration agreement.’”).
31. Wigner, supra note 29, at 1502.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Wigner, supra note 29, at 1503.
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would protect arbitration agreements and won several victories at that level.38
Then, they lobbied Congress.39
In 1925, their lobbying efforts succeeded.40 Congress enacted the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which provided that “a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy . . .
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”41 In enacting the
FAA, Congress clearly meant to overturn the common law precedent against
arbitration.42 For the FAA to apply to a transaction, the transaction need only
be contained in a “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”43
The Court has noted that the transaction involving commerce requirement is
not difficult to meet, and it rarely bars the application of the FAA.44
Furthermore, in order to ensure that these agreements are enforced,
Section 3 of the FAA directs that all “courts of the United States” must grant
a motion to stay litigation, pending arbitration, if the court determines that
the contract requires the matter to be arbitrated.45 Before the Southland
decision discussed below, many commentators pointed out that the phrase
“courts of the United States” suggested that Section 3 was only applicable to
federal courts and not to state courts.46 According to this view, the FAA was
merely a procedural law passed to control the federal courts.47
On the other hand, others have pointed to Section 2’s reference to “a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” noting that this
phrase suggests that Congress was invoking its commerce clause power in
passing the FAA.48 Under this view, the FAA would apply to both the states
and the federal courts as substantive law.49 A review of the legislative
history of the FAA provided no answers to this debate.50 Thus, this debate
was left largely unsettled until the Southland case, discussed below.51

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
42. Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory
Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and A Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 799 (2002).
43. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
44. Jon R. Schumacher, The Reach of the Federal Arbitration Act: Implications On State Procedural
Law, 70 N.D. L. REV. 459, 462–63 (1994) (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 401 n.7).
45. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012); Id. at 463.
46. Schumacher, supra note 44, at 463.
47. Id. at 463–65.
48. Id. at 464–65.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 461 n.25 (providing a good discussion of the FAA’s perplexing legislative history. In a
House Report, Congress stated that “[t]he purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible [sic]
agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction
or [sic] admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal courts.”).
51. See id. at 464–65.
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B. Expansive interpretation of the FAA
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, franchisees of certain 7-Eleven stores
sued their franchisor, the Southland Corporation (“Southland”), in California
Superior Court.52 Southland’s agreement with its franchisees contained an
arbitration clause.53 Based on that clause, it moved to stay the proceedings
pending arbitration.54 The Superior Court granted the motion to stay on all
claims except those covered by a California statute, the Franchise Investment
Law (“FIL”).55 As interpreted by the California Supreme Court, claims
brought under the FIL must be brought to a judicial forum and may not be
arbitrated.56
Southland appealed, and the case eventually reached the U.S. Supreme
Court.57 The Court found that the FIL was in direct conflict with the FAA
because the FAA required the enforcement of arbitration clauses and the FIL
attempted to prevent the enforcement of these clauses in certain cases.58
Because of this direct conflict between state and federal law, the FIL was
preempted.59
However, before the Court’s decision, remember that it was an open
question whether the FAA applied to a case like Southland at all, which was
initiated in state court.60 In fact, certain members of the Court believed that
the FAA only applied to federal courts and that the preemption of the FIL
would only apply if the case were brought in federal court.61 Therefore,
because Southland was brought in state court, some on the Court believed
that the California statute requiring judicial resolution of claims could be
given effect.62
The majority, however, rejected this interpretation, holding that the FAA
was substantive law applicable to both state and federal courts.63 Because
the FAA applied to both state and federal courts, it preempted the FIL’s

52. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1984).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id. at 4–5.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
59. Id. But see id. at 18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “it is by no means clear that Congress
intended entirely to displace State authority in this field.”).
60. Schumacher, supra note 44, at 463.
61. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that the American Bar
Association Committee that lobbied for enactment of the FAA stated “the statute establishes a procedure
in the Federal courts for the enforcement of arbitration agreements . . . .”).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 12.
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attempt to prevent the enforcement of arbitration clauses, even though the
franchisees sued in California state court.64
In reaching its decision that broadly construed the arbitration right, the
Court articulated that the purpose of the FAA was to ensure that the
arbitration right was placed on the same footing as any other contract right.65
The same footing policy is important in analyzing the scope of various
aspects of the arbitration right, including arbitration waiver.66 Therefore,
when this note examines the two approaches to waiver, it will consider which
approach places the arbitration right on the same footing as all other contract
rights.67 This note will conclude that the approach that places the arbitration
right on the same footing is the proper approach consistent with the FAA, as
interpreted by the Court in Southland.68
C. Arbitration Waiver
Section 2 of the FAA provides that “a contract . . . to settle by arbitration
a controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”69
Arbitration waiver is one of the those grounds.70 If a party who has a right to
arbitrate under his contract waives that right, he must proceed in court and
may not seek resolution of the matter in arbitration.71
An arbitration term can be waived by participating in litigation.72 This
type of waiver occurs when a party brings a case to court, notwithstanding an
arbitration term in his contract.73 The participation by the party in a court
proceeding may be conduct that reveals his intent to waive his contractual
right to arbitrate.74

64. Id. at 5, 10.
65. Id. at 16. Some might argue that the Court meant to put the arbitration on a better footing than
other contract rights based upon the “national policy favoring arbitration” that it also enumerates in this
case. Id. at 10. However, it is important to note that the “national policy favoring arbitration” exists
merely to ensure “the enforcement of arbitration agreements.” Id.
66. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16; see also Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d
388, 389–90 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing St. Mary’s Medical Center of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum
Prods. Co., 969 F.2d 585 (7th Cir.1992)) (suggesting that some courts improperly use the “federal policy
favoring arbitration” to interpret arbitration clauses more favorably than other contract clauses. The courts
should treat arbitration clauses “no less hospitably” than other contract clauses).
67. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16; Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390.
68. 465 U.S. at 16.
69. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Although the circuits all agree that a showing must be made that the
movant75 participated in litigation, there is a circuit split as to whether any
additional showing is necessary.76 The minority approach is that the nonmovant77 need only show that the movant participated in litigation.78 In
contrast, the majority approach is that non-movant must show both that 1) the
movant participated in litigation and that, from this participation in
litigation, 2) he has suffered prejudice.79 This note will begin with an
examination of the majority approach, which requires a showing that the
non-movant has suffered prejudice.80
D. The Majority Approach
1. The participation element originates from the traditional waiver test
Because Southland requires that arbitration be put on the same footing as
all other contract terms, it is important to consider the traditional contract law
test for waiver and compare it to the arbitration waiver test applied by the
circuits.81 In contract law, waiver is defined as the (1) “intentional
relinquishment” of a (2) “known right.”82 In the arbitration context, the
second part of this definition, the knowledge requirement, is typically not
included as a separate element in the arbitration waiver analysis83 because it
is rarely difficult to prove; the movant is often the one who drafted the
arbitration clause and thus has knowledge of his right to arbitrate.

75. The movant is the party who seeks to bring the case, now being litigated in court, to arbitration.
Thus, the movant files a motion to stay the case, pending arbitration.
76. See Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115, 1118–19 (8th Cir. 2011)
(“There is a circuit split over whether the party asserting waiver must show prejudice.”).
77. The non-movant is the party who does not want the case, now in court, to be brought to arbitration.
Thus, he opposes the movant’s motion to stay the case, pending arbitration.
78. The following three cases hold that prejudice is not a required element in the waiver analysis,
although it may be considered as a factor. Hill v. Ricoh Ams. Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 774–75 (10th Cir.
2010); St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prods. Co., 969 F.2d 585, 590 (7th
Cir. 1992); Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 777 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
79. For cases applying the 2-part participation and prejudice test, see Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs.,
P.A., 387 F. App'x 921, 923 (11th Cir. 2010); Crossville Med. Oncology, P.C. v. Glenwood Sys., LLC,
310 F. App’x 858, 859 (6th Cir. 2009); Forrester v. Penn Lyon Homes, Inc., 553 F.3d 340, 343 (4th Cir.
2009); Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 222 (3d Cir. 2007); Walker v. J.C. Bradford &
Co., 938 F.2d 575, 577 (5th Cir. 1991); Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd. v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 754 F.2d
457, 461 (2d Cir. 1985). For cases applying the 3-part test, which includes a knowledge requirement, see
Erdman, 650 F.3d at 1117; Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1986). For a
case applying an alternative test, see Jones Motor Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local Union
No. 633 of New Hampshire, 671 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1982) (applying a 6-factor test).
80. E.g., Erdman, 650 F.3d at 1117 (applying the 3-part test).
81. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
82. Ryder v. Bank of Hickory Hills, 146 Ill. 2d 98, 104 (1991).
83. See supra note 79 for cases that entirely omit the knowledge requirement from their arbitration
waiver test and instead focus solely on participation and prejudice.
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In contrast, the first part of this definition, the intent requirement, is
embodied in the participation in litigation element of the arbitration waiver
test.84 In essence, the movant’s participation in litigation is conduct that
implies his intent to waive his arbitration right.85
2. The origins of the prejudice element
Intent and knowledge are the only elements required by the traditional
contract law theory of waiver.86 However, in the majority of circuits, courts
have added a third element, prejudice, to show arbitration waiver.87 This
element is absent from the traditional contract law waiver test.88 Because of
its absence from the traditional test, some have argued that it should be
eliminated from the arbitration waiver test as well.89 Therefore, this note will
examine the origin of the prejudice requirement in the arbitration context.
Prejudice appears to originate from a Second Circuit case, Carcich v.
Rederi A/B Nordie.90 In that case, longshoremen were injured while working
on a ship.91 They sued the ship’s owners, and the owners then brought a
third-party complaint against the shipping company, the Cunard Steamship
Company (“Cunard”).92 On July 15, 1964, Cunard answered the complaint,
arguing that the case should be arbitrated pursuant to a term in their
contract.93 However, Cunard did not officially move to stay the case pending
arbitration until November 1966.94 The district court denied the motion, and
Cunard appealed.95
The plaintiffs argued that Cunard, by taking over two years to move to
stay the proceedings, waived its contractual right to arbitrate.96 However, the
Second Circuit disagreed, finding that there was no waiver.97 Although the
court admitted that taking two years was certainly an act inconsistent with
the right to arbitrate, this “mere delay” was not enough.98 There needed to be

84. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995).
85. Id.; see also Ryder, 146 Ill. 2d at 105 (“Waiver may be made by an express agreement or it may be
implied from the conduct of the party who is alleged to have waived a right.”)
86. Ryder, 146 Ill. 2d at 104.
87. E.g., Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 2011).
88. Ryder, 146 Ill. 2d at 104.
89. See infra Part II.E; see also infra Part III.
90. Erdman, 650 F.3d at 1120 n.4 (“We can trace the origins of our prejudice requirement to Carcich v.
Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir.1968).”).
91. Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 693–94 (2d Cir. 1968).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 696.
96. Id.
97. Carcich, 389 F.2d at 696.
98. Id.
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some showing of prejudice to the plaintiffs, and that element was absent
here.99
In subsequent cases, the Second Circuit has explained that prejudice
relates to some sort of “inherent unfairness—in terms of delay, expense, or
damage to a party’s legal position—that occurs when the party’s opponent
forces it to litigate an issue and later seeks to arbitrate that same issue.”100
Thus, there are two parts to the prejudice analysis: (1) the delay and expense
sub-element, and (2) the legal position sub-element.101 In Carcich, for
example, the court observed that prejudice would have been found if the
movant could be shown to have taken “unfair advantage of discovery
proceedings which would not have been available to it in arbitration . . . .”102
While the delay and expense sub-element was present, the legal position subelement was absent because the defendant had not availed himself of the
mechanisms of discovery.103 Therefore, the court found that there was no
prejudice to the plaintiffs, and Cunard could properly move the matter from
litigation to arbitration.104
The legal position sub-element of prejudice is a fact-specific inquiry, and
several factors often lead to a finding of damage to one’s legal position,
although none are conclusive.105 The factors include: (1) the use of
depositions, (2) the filing of motions on the merits, and (3) the raising of
“thirteen affirmative defenses.”106
Thus, the prejudice element, which focuses on the unfairness to the nonmovant resisting arbitration, has a long-standing history in arbitration law.107
Nevertheless, in recent years, at least three circuits have begun to question
the need for this element in the arbitration waiver test.108
99. Id.
100. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Webster Auto Parts, Inc., 128 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 1997).
101. Id.; see 3 Commercial Arbitration § 50:48 (2012) (“The true test of prejudice is not delay alone.
Rather, the waiver of the right to arbitrate must be viewed both as to the length of time the court case has
continued as well as the degree to which the party (who later proposes arbitration) has engaged the
machinery of litigation. This makes the assessment of prejudice a qualitative judgment as to the intensity
of the litigation.”); see also Frye v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 877 F.2d 396, 399 (5th Cir.
1989) (holding that “[b]oth delay[s] and the extent of the moving party’s participation in judicial
proceedings” factor into a determination of prejudice).
102. 389 F.2d at 696.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887–91 (2d Cir. 1985).
106. Id.; see S. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Medquist, Inc., 258 F. App’x 466, 467–68 (3d Cir. 2007) (ruling
that contests over the merits of a case suggest prejudice but non-merit motion practice does not cause
prejudice unless it is extensive); see also Baker v. Conoco Pipeline Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1301
(N.D. Okla. 2003) (finding that the movant’s use of “[l]imited interrogatories,” but not depositions, prior
to moving to stay arbitration did not prejudice the non-movant).
107. Carcich, 389 F.2d at 696 (2d Cir. 1968); see Rush, 779 F.2d at 887 (citing Carcich, 389 F.2d at
696); see also Erdman Co. 650 F.3d at 1120 n.4 (recognizing that Carcich, 389 F.2d at 696, was the origin
of the prejudice element).
108. Hill, 603 F.3d at 772–73; St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc., 969 F.2d at 590–91; Nat’l
Found. for Cancer Research, 821 F.2d at 777.
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E. The Minority Approach
Three circuits have chosen to eliminate prejudice as an element of
arbitration waiver.109 Instead, they focus on the participation in litigation
element that examines how a movant’s participation in litigation may reveal
an intent to forfeit his or her right to move the case to arbitration.110 In
discussing the minority approach, this note will analyze the Seventh Circuit’s
arbitration waiver test, primarily because this circuit goes the furthest in
eliminating almost all vestiges of prejudice from its waiver analysis.111 The
Seventh Circuit reached its current waiver test through two cases.112 First, in
St. Mary’s Medical Center of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Products
Co., the Seventh Circuit turned prejudice from an element of arbitration
waiver into a mere factor.113 Prejudice would remain part of the analysis, but
a showing of prejudice was no longer required to prove arbitration waiver.114
Second, three years later, in Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc. v. KraftMaid
Cabinetry Inc., the Seventh Circuit did something even more revolutionary;
in an opinion written by Chief Judge Posner, the Circuit almost completely
eliminated the role of prejudice in the waiver analysis.115
III. INSTANT CASE
A. Factual Background
Cabinetree was a retailer of kitchen cabinets, sinks, faucets, and similar
items.116 In 1989, it entered into a written agreement with KraftMaid, a
manufacturer of cabinets, to purchase its products.117 In addition to their
written contract, the parties also orally agreed that Cabinetree would be the
exclusive retailer of KraftMaid products in the Milwaukee/Waukesha area.118
For about two years, the relationship went well.119
109. The following three cases hold that prejudice is not a required element in the waiver analysis,
although it may be considered as a factor: Hill, 603 F.3d at 772–75; St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville,
Inc., 969 F.2d at 590; Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research, 821 F.2d at 777–78.
110. See St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc., 969 F.2d at 589 (“The district court could reasonably
conclude from all of this that Disco acted inconsistently with any intent to assert its right to arbitrate”).
111. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Today we
take the next step in the evolution of doctrine, and hold that an election to proceed before a nonarbitral
tribunal for the resolution of a contractual dispute is a presumptive waiver of the right to arbitrate.”).
112. Id.; St. Mary’s, 969 F.2d at 590.
113. 969 F.2d at 590.
114. Id.
115. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390–91.
116. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 296, 297 (E.D. Wis. 1996)
(hereinafter “Cabintree II”).
117. Id. at 297–98.
118. Id. at 297–99.
119. Id. at 299.
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However, in 1992, things began to sour when KraftMaid started selling
its products to two other retailers—Menards and Handy Andy—in the
Milwaukee/Waukesha area.120 The competition from these two retailers
caused a drop in Cabinetree’s sale of KraftMaid products.121 In response to
this drop in sales, KraftMaid told Cabinetree that it would no longer sell its
cabinets to Cabinetree on credit.122
Cabinetree viewed the failure to extend credit as termination of a
franchise relationship and the sale to other retailers in the
Milwaukee/Waukesha area as a breach of an oral exclusivity agreement.123
Cabinetree sued in Wisconsin state court on September 30, 1993.124 On
November 4, 1993, KraftMaid removed the case to federal district court.125
Then, on July 11, 1994, KraftMaid “dropped a bombshell into the
proceedings” when it moved to stay the matter pending arbitration.126 The
district court denied the motion, and KraftMaid appealed.127
B. Holding and Reasoning
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that KraftMaid had waived its
contractual right to move to stay the case pending arbitration.128 In so
finding, the court enumerated a new rule for arbitration waiver: “an election
to proceed before a nonarbitral tribunal for the resolution of a contractual
dispute is a presumptive waiver of the right to arbitrate.”129 Thus, the court
focused the waiver inquiry solely on what the movant did or did not do; it
eliminated almost any inquiry into the prejudice element.130 Because
KraftMaid had removed the case to federal court without also moving to stay
the case pending arbitration, it elected to forgo its right to assert the
arbitration right.131
The court found that this new rule was better founded in contract law.132
In the court’s view, the prejudice element was not consistent with the

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Cabinetree II, 914 F. Supp. at 299.
123. Id. at 297, 299.
124. Id. at 297.
125. Id.
126. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 389; Cabinetree II, 914 F. Supp. at 297.
127. Cabinetree II, 914 F. Supp. at 297.
128. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391.
129. Id. at 390.
130. Id. However, note that the court allowed for a very narrow exception where prejudice might apply.
Id. at 391. If the movant could establish that special circumstances existed, such as “doubts about
arbitrability,” then the burden would shift to the movant to establish prejudice. Id. Nevertheless, absent a
showing of special circumstances, this rule places the burden squarely on the party who wishes to uphold
the contract. Id.
131. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390.
132. Id.
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traditional contract law waiver test, which focuses on intent.133 It explained
that adding the prejudice element put the arbitration right on a better footing
than all other contract rights, and the right to arbitrate should only be put on
the same footing as all other contract rights.134
According to the court, if the arbitration right is to be put on the same
footing as all other contract terms, the intent-based waiver test must be
used.135 The court found that intent could be implied from KraftMaid’s
conduct.136 Because KraftMaid’s conduct of removing the case to federal
court without moving to stay the case pending arbitration showed an intent to
waive its arbitration right, the court held that Cabinetree presumptively
waived its right to arbitrate.137
IV. ANALYSIS
A. A major flaw in the Cabinetree approach
Although the Seventh Circuit’s presumptive waiver rule has gained some
academic praise, this approach is flawed because it lacks any basis in
contract law notions of waiver.138
When examining contract law, one finds that it is nearly impossible for
courts to imply waiver of a contract term based on conduct alone.139 One
court stated that implied waiver only arises where there are “undisputed acts
or language so inconsistent with a purpose to stand on the contract provisions
as to leave no opportunity for a reasonable inference to the contrary.”140 A
Texas court acknowledged the difficulty of proving implied waiver, stating
that “without an admission of waiver by the opposite party, it is difficult to
prove waiver as a matter of law.”141

133. Id.; Ryder, 585 N.E.2d at 49.
134. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390–91.
135. Id.; Ryder, 585 N.E.2d at 104–05. Once again, it is noted that the knowledge element is rarely an
issue in arbitration waiver because the party asserting waiver is usually the party who drafted the
arbitration clause. See supra note 79 for cases that entirely omit the knowledge requirement from their
arbitration waiver test and instead focus solely on participation and prejudice.
136. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390.
137. Id.
138 Id. For an example of an article favoring the adoption of the Cabinetree presumption in other
circuits, see Zachary Kerner, Jung v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 179,
188–89 (2009).
139. Cohen v. Independence Blue Cross, 820 F. Supp. 2d 594, 606 (D.N.J. 2011).
140. Id.; see also Sturbridge Home Builders, Inc. v. Downing Seaport, Inc., 890 A.2d 58, 65 (R.I. 2005)
(“A waiver may be proved indirectly by facts and circumstances from which intention to waive may be
clearly inferred.”) (citing 28 AM. JUR. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 225 (2000)). It is also interesting to note
that the Seventh Circuit, in applying Illinois law in a diversity case, restated this very same rule: an
implied waiver must be “clearly inferable from the circumstances.” Bank v. Truck Ins. Exch., 51 F.3d
736, 739 (7th Cir. 1995).
141. RM Crowe Prop. Servs. Co., v. Strategic Energy, L.L.C., 348 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex. Ct. App.
2011).
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The reluctance of courts to imply waiver of a contractual term is at the
very heart of contract law.142 A contract right is bargained for, and its terms
represent the express intent of the parties.143 Even with contracts of
adhesion, the parties have the opportunity to read the contract, and they
manifest their express intent to be bound by entering into the agreement.144
This express intent should not be lightly overturned through implied intent
inferred from actions or inactions of questionable meaning.145
In fact, the Seventh Circuit, the very same court that was willing to imply
waiver in the arbitration context, has acknowledged the danger of implying
waiver in another context.146 In a case involving an alleged breach of
contract by an insurance company, the court discussed the “inherent
implausibility of offers to prove ‘bare’ waiver in a contractual setting.”147
The court noted that “[u]nless the right waived is a minor one . . . , why
would someone give it up in exchange for nothing?”148
It is clear that an arbitration clause represents the parties’ express intent
to resolve any disputes between them by arbitration.149 Under a traditional
contract law waiver theory, conduct may implicitly waive a contract right
only if it clearly manifests an intent to forgo that right.150 A party’s
participation in litigation, however, is not conduct that clearly manifests an
intent to forgo the arbitration right because there are other reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from a party’s election to bring a case to
court.151 As the Seventh Circuit itself noted, a party might not be certain if
an issue is arbitrable.152 If that party arbitrates and then learns that the issue
is not arbitrable, the statute of limitations might have passed, and the court
might refuse to litigate the matter.153 Therefore, a party might bring a case to
court merely with the intent of determining whether an issue may be
arbitrated.154 Notice that the party’s intent to determine whether an issue
may be arbitrated is not an intent to forgo the arbitration right.155
Therefore, it may not properly be said that participation in litigation
clearly manifests an intent to forgo arbitration.156 The minority approach is
142. Bank, 51 F.3d at 739–40.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Bank, 51 F.3d at 739–40.
149. Id.
150. Cohen, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 606.
151. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390–91 (7th Cir. 1995).
152. Id.
153. See id. (acknowledging that there are a “variety of circumstances” that do not suggest an intention
to forgo the arbitration right).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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simply not grounded in contract law; an intent to forgo arbitration is not
clearly inferable from a party’s participation in litigation.157
B. The sound basis for the majority approach in traditional notions of
estoppel
The majority approach states that arbitration waiver requires both
participation in litigation and prejudice.158 While the Seventh Circuit
correctly noted that prejudice is absent from the traditional waiver test, it
failed to consider whether another contract law theory might support the
majority rule.159 If it had, the Seventh Circuit might have found justification
for the majority rule in the theory of waiver by estoppel.160
Under waiver by estoppel, a contract right is given up if the waiving
party’s conduct causes the non-waiving party to be “misled to his or her
prejudice by the conduct of the other party into the honest and reasonable
belief that the other party was not insisting upon some right.”161 Unlike
waiver, estoppel is a doctrine founded upon equity and fairness.162 It is not
necessarily meant to give effect to the party’s intent.163 Instead, estoppel
prevents injustice by prohibiting a party from “repudiat[ing] a course of
action on which another party has relied to his detriment.”164
The majority view on arbitration waiver should be adopted by all of the
circuits because only this test is consistent with a traditional contract law
theory—waiver by estoppel.165 As even proponents of the minority view
recognize, arbitration waiver is about whether it is fair to subject the nonmoving party to arbitration when the movant has participated in litigation.166
To answer this fairness inquiry, the majority view properly focuses on the
question of prejudice, which asks whether the non-moving party has
detrimentally relied on the moving party’s participation in litigation.167 By
focusing on fairness and by assessing fairness in terms of detrimental
157. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390–91.
158. E.g., Erdman Co., 650 F.3d at 1117.
159. See Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390–91.
160. Id.; 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:29 (4th ed.).
161. 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:29 (4th ed.) (emphasis added); see also Saverslak v. DavisCleaver Produce Co., 606 F.2d 208, 213 (7th Cir. 1979) (“An estoppel . . . arises only when a party’s
conduct misleads another to believe that a right will not be enforced and causes him to act to his detriment
in reliance upon this belief.”).
162. Knorr v. Smeal, 836 A.2d 794, 799 (N.J. 2003).
163. Oakland Raiders v. Oakland-Alameda Cnty. Coliseum, Inc., 51 Cal. Rptr.3d 144, 153–54 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (“While the question of waiver ordinarily turns on the intent of the party against whom it is
asserted, estoppel focuses solely on the party’s conduct . . . .”).
164. Knorr, 836 A.2d at 799.
165. Erdman Co., 650 F.3d at 1117; 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:29 (4th ed.).
166. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391 (“Neither in its briefs nor at oral argument did Kraftmaid give any
reason for its delay in filing the stay besides needing time ‘to weigh its options.’ That is the worst
possible reason for delay . . . . It wanted to play heads I win, tails you lose.”).
167. E.g., Erdman Co., 650 F.3d at 1117.
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reliance, the majority view has adopted the traditional contract law notion of
estoppel, which permits courts to avoid giving contracts their full effect when
it would not be equitable.168
Because the majority view has adopted this test from contract law and
the minority view has not, only the majority view truly places the arbitration
right on the same footing as all other contract rights.169 Therefore, it is
incumbent on all the circuits to maintain or adopt the majority view on
arbitration waiver because only this view is consistent with the FAA, which
has been interpreted to require that the arbitration right be put on the same
footing as all contract rights.170
V. CONCLUSION
As this note has discussed, in order for the arbitration right to be placed
on the same footing as other contract rights, a court should require the nonmovant to prove that he has suffered some prejudice, such that the movant
should be estopped from moving to stay the case, pending arbitration.171
Note that, by enforcing arbitration like all other contract rights, society
appreciates many benefits.172 Facilitating arbitration reduces the cost, and
increases the efficiency, of dispute resolution.173 These reduced costs and
increased efficiencies174, which often benefit businesses directly, may also
flow to consumers in the form of lower prices and higher value.
Despite these benefits, perhaps it is unfair for arbitration clauses to be
treated the same as all other contractual clauses.175 For example, there are
concerns that arbitrators may not be as unbiased as state and federal judges,
and they may favor the business party over the consumer.176 This same
concern applies to arbitration waiver as well, where it seems unfair that a
party may bring a case to court “to weigh its options” and then move to stay
the case pending arbitration.177 The Seventh Circuit has called this a game of
“heads I win, tails you lose.”178

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.; 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:29 (4th ed.).
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 15-16; Erdman Co., 650 F.3d at 1117.
9 U.S.C.A § 2 (West 2012); Southland, 465 U.S. at 15–16; Erdman Co., 650 F.3d at 1117.
13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:29 (4th ed.).
Spencer, supra note 4, at D1.
Id.
Id.
Editorial, supra note 6.
Id.
Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id.
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Nevertheless, this line of reasoning ignores a very fundamental principal
to American jurisprudence—freedom of contract.179 It is important to be
mindful that arbitration is not being forced on the parties.180 Instead, the
parties have voluntarily agreed to enter into a contract with a mandatory
arbitration clause.181 In so doing, they have the power both to craft an
arbitration clause in whatever way they see fit, or, at the very least, to refuse
to enter into it.182 Their election to enter into a contract, rather than a court’s
after-the-fact second-guessing, should generally signal its inherent fairness,
absent evidence of fraud, duress, or coercion.183
Furthermore, even in cases where a court finds after-the-fact that
enforcement of a contract is unfair, contract law affords the court some
latitude not to enforce the contract under the doctrine of estoppel.184 This
doctrine, embodied in the majority approach’s prejudice requirement, is a
workable test that should prevent any game of “heads I win, tails you
lose.”185
Courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, are not free to weaken the arbitration
waiver test such that it does not comport with general contract law.186
Eliminating the prejudice requirement has exactly that result.187 It places
arbitration on a lesser footing than all other contract provisions.188 In the
FAA, Congress decided to place arbitration on the same footing as all other

179. See 16B AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 641 (2012) (discussing freedom of contract and how
“courts will not limit this freedom to contract except under certain situations, such as the provision being
against public policy, made under fraud or duress, and other considerations where the court in a legal
proceeding has before it the unreasonableness of the contract provision”).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. (“The freedom of contract also entails the freedom not to contract.”). This argument is
particularly compelling in cases such as Southland and Cabinetree, where the parties were both
businesses. In contrast, where one of the parties is a consumer and the other is a business, it could be
argued that the first power, the power to craft the agreement, is not present. Of course, the second power,
the power to refuse to enter the contract, remains.
183. 16B AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 641 (2012).
184. 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:29 (4th ed.).
185. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995); 13
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:29 (4th ed.). In reality, the problem is not the prejudice requirement at
all. The real potential for abuse, which could create the “heads I win, tails you lose” situation, arises if
courts fail to strictly apply the prejudice factors discussed in the text accompanying note 107. See
Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391 (referring to “heads I win, tails you lose”). However, courts adhering to the
majority view do in fact apply these factors strictly. For example, although the Fifth Circuit maintains
“[a] presumption against waiver” and places “a heavy burden of proof” on the party asserting waiver, it
acknowledges that “[a]ny attempt to go to the merits and to retain still the right to arbitration is clearly
impermissible.” Petroleum Pipe Americas Corp. v. Jindal Saw, Ltd., 575 F.3d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quotations omitted).
186. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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contract provisions.189 Only Congress, not the courts, is free to change this
policy.190

189. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1924)).
190. Id. The need for judicial restraint in this instance is particularly important because the FAA was
passed to overturn a common law precedent against arbitration.

